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In this paper we highlight the role of peers in the recurrence of addictive behavior. To do so, we use a 
simple “forward looking” model with procrastination and peers influence. Our results show that while 
procrastination can explain the decision to postpone rehabilitation, peers influence is essential to explain 
the cyclical patterns of addiction-rehabilitation-addiction. 
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Dans cet article nous analysons l’influence des pairs dans la récurrence de la dépendance. Nous utilisons 
un modèle simple avec procrastination et influence des pairs. Nos résultats indiquent que même si la 
procrastination peut expliquer la décision de repousser à plus tard la désintoxication, l’influence des 
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 1 Introduction
Our common welfare should come rst; personal recovery depends upon
alcoholics anonymous unity.
[Alcoholics Anonymous (1972), A Brief Guide to Alcoholics Anonymous.]
Addictive behavior, in all its forms, is a social problem that is very present in every
day life: gambling, binge drinking, smoking, substance use, over-eating, caeine addiction,
work addiction etc... There is a precious body of theoretical as well as empirical literature
that has tackled a wide variety of addictive behaviors from dierent perspectives namely,
myopia and habit formation (Lewit & Coate 1983, Baltagi & Levin 1986, Jones 1989, Jones
1994) as well as stock accumulation (Becker & Murphy 1988, Dockner & Feichtinger 1993,
Orphanides & Zervos 1998, Baltagi & Grin 2001). Particular attention was given to the
role of cumulative consumption in explainning addiction and its recurrence. The decision to
consume addictively, to stop, or to engage in cyclical patterns of addiction-rehabilitation-
addiction, in this case, was considered to be endogenously determined.1 While a person's
consumption habit over time constitutes an important determinant of addictive behavior,
we are inclined to think that addictive behavior has more than one dimension. This is
why we choose to tackle addictive consumption and its recurrence from another angle.
Particularly, we focus on the importance of social interaction with peers in shaping addictive
consumption habits and its incidence on recurrence.
The empirical literature on the impact of peers in general, and the impacts of peers
on addictive behaviors in particular, has been very active (Jones 1994, Borsari & Carey
2001, Duncan, Boisjoly, Kremer, Levy & Eccles 2005, Lundborg 2006, Kremer & Levy 2008).
Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, little attention was given to role of external factors such
as social interaction in explaining the recurrence of addictive behavior from a theoretical
perspective.2 In this paper, we attempt to ll this gap in the literature by introducing
the impact of peers in a simple \forward looking" framework with procrastination (Akerlof
1991).3
1Through myopia and habit formation or stock accumulation.
2We use external factors or exogenous factors interchangeably to refer to factors that are not endogenously
determined by the model.
3It is important to note that while empirical evidence show that the \forward looking" assumption is
veried, there is no evidence that the time consistent preference is veried (Gruber & Koszegi 2001). Also
there is a wide evidence both empirical and experimental that points toward time inconsistent preferences
1One may argue that the consumption of an addictive substance remains a personal choice
of a \forward looking" agent. However, social interaction with peers and the cost of \non-
conformity" play a non-negligible role in initiating and shaping the consumption of addictive
substance. Peer eects may then be perceived as an externality. In this perspective, it is
important to provide a close look on the role of such exogenous forces on the recurrence
of the addictive behavior. If peers play a determinant role in the recurrence of addictive
behaviors, then it might be ecient to exploit this information while addressing addiction
problems. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces our
model. Section three presents a simple model with a forward looking agent. Section four
adds procrastination to the basic model and section ve incorportates the impact of peers.
Finally, section ve concludes.
2 The Model
We consider an agent making an inter-temporal decision over an addictive good x. For
simplicity, we assume that the choice of this agent is limited to three levels of consumption:
0, if he decides not the consume the good, x, if he consumes the good socially and xmax
if he is addicted. At time t = 0 the agent is not addicted, so he has two choices: he may
consume 0 or x. If he decides to engage in consumption, there is a probability  that
he becomes addicted at period 1. If he is not addicted at period 1, we assume that the
agent is then able to consume the good \socially"(i.e. x) and will never become addicted.
If he becomes addicted, his consumption remains at xmax as long as he does not engage
into rehabilitation. We assume that there is a xed cost  > 0 for rehabilitation. We also
assume that once rehabilitated, the agent can choose to stay clean forever or to consume
again. If the agent decides to consume again he will consume the addicted level xmax.





0 if xt = 0
B if xt = x
Bmax if xt = xmax
(1)
We assume that B > Bmax > 0.
(Thaler 1981, Benzion, Rapoport & Yagil 1989, Angeletos, Laibson, Repetto, Tobacman & Weinberg 2001,
Laibson, Repetto & Tobacman 2007)
2Let assume that consuming the addictive good at time t induces a health cost H() at





0 if xt = 0
H if xt = x
Hmax if xt = xmax
(2)
We assume that those health cost are such that benet from consuming at the social level
B is greater than the discounted health costs, H. We also assume that the benet from
an addictive consumption Bmax is less than the discounted health costs incurred from an
addictive consumption Hmax, where  is the inter-temporal discount factor.
3 The forward looking agent with time consistent prefer-
ences
In this section we present a simplied model of \rational addiction". In this framework, the
agent chooses to consume the addictive good if the discounted values of the consumption
stream exceeds its discounted cost. This net value of consuming the addictive good is given
by:









t(B   H): (3)
A close look at (3) indicates that while taking his decision at time 0, the agent anticipates
that if he becomes addicted he would chose the best option between engaging into reha-
bilitation permanently or consuming addictively forever. If he does not become an addict,
then he will keep on consuming the social level x.
Proposition 1 A forward looking agent with time consistent preferences chooses to con-
sume the addictive good if V0 > 0. If he becomes addicted, the agent
1. stays addicted forever if  >  
P1
t=0 t(Bmax   Hmax) or,
2. chooses rehabilitation and never consume again if    
P1
t=0 t(Bmax   Hmax).
3In this model, the agent has time consistent preferences. If the agent chooses to reha-
bilitate, then recurrence is impossible. In fact, the agent fully anticipates that the inter-
temporal utility of re-consuming the addictive good is negative once rehabilitated. In this
context, policies aecting the net benet of consumption, B or the cost of rehabilitation, 
will aect the consumption of addictive goods. However, as pointed out by Akerlof (1991),
the application of such models, combined with utilitarian ethics, leads to the conclusion that
no intervention on the substance market is economically sound in absence of a consumption
externality.
4 The impact of procrastination
Akerlof (1991) argues that rational addiction models do not accurately describe individuals'
drug or alcohol consumption decisions. He further argues that most drug users consider
that the long term cost of their addiction exceeds its benets. They all intend to cut down
on their consumption, but tend to procrastinate their decision to stop.
Actions like smoking a cigarette, having a drink, eating a candy bar, and
working overtime to \catch up" all lead to immediate and certain gratica-
tion, whereas their bad consequences are remote in time, only probabilistic, and
still avoidable now. It is no contest: Certain and immediate rewards win out
over probabilistic and remote costs, even though the rewards are slight and the
possible costs lethal.
[quoted in Akerlof (1991) from Brown (1986)]
To account for procrastination, Akerlof (1991) introduces an extra salience factor for
actual benets and/or costs.4 Let  denote this extra salience parameter, then the initial
present value of engaging into substance consumption becomes:









t(B   H): (4)
4It is important to note that Akerlof's representation is mathematically equivalent to hyperbolic dis-
counting.
4A peculiar thing with procrastination is that the extra salience parameter is always
applied on present benets and costs as time moves on, but the agent does not anticipate

























 (1 + )g if addicted
(5)
In equations (4) and (5), the agent's preferences are not time consistent. This is due
to the presence of an extra-salience parameter, . In this context, an addicted agent may
always plan to stop his addictive behavior tomorrow. This would be the case if b Vt > 0 and
P1
i=1 i(Bmax   Hmax) <  .
Proposition 2 An agent subject to procrastination chooses to consume the addictive good
if b V0 = V0 + B > 0. If he becomes addicted, the agent
1. stays addicted forever if (1 + ) > ( + Hmax)   (1 + )Bmax or,
2. chooses rehabilitation and never consume again if (1+)  (+Hmax) (1+)Bmax.
Thus, the addicted agent stays addicted forever if the cost of disintoxication tomorrow is
perceived to be less than the cost of disintoxication today. Also, the addicted agent would
chose to cut o the addictive consumption forever, if the value of  is such that rehabilitation
is less costly today. Proposition 2 has two implications. First, the agent may engage into
consumption even if it is not a sound economic decision from an inter-temporal perspective.
This occurs when V0 < 0 and B >  V0. Second, the agent may possibly postpone his
rehabilitation at each period, even if rehabilitation is a sound economic decision. It is
important to emphasize that in both cases, there is room for implementing a public health
policy on addictive substances. Any intervention that may reduce the expected benet or
increase the expected cost of substance use can be considered a sound economic policy.
Also, any policy that reduces the cost of rehabilitation can also help circumscribe the
problem associated with procrastination. Nevertheless, even if rehabilitation is free (i.e.
5 = 0), it is still possible that an addicted consumer postpones rehabilitation forever if
(1+)Bmax > Hmax. Before introducing the impact of peers in the framework, we would
like to mention that if an agent decides to rehabilitate, he will never choose to consume
again. This implies that the presence of extra salience in the agent's preferences cannot
explain the recurrence of addictive behavior.
5 The impact of peer inuence
The consumption of many addictive substances are often associated with socialization with
a group of peers. For example, van den Bree & Pickworth (2005), using the National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, nd evidence that allows for the conclusion that
a peer's involvement in marijuana consumption increases the risk of marijuana consumption
and addiction. To capture these eects in our model, we assume that there is a cost  of
deviating from the group's norm of consumption. In this context, social interaction must
be taken into consideration when analyzing the agent's behavior. For simplicity, we assume
that this peer eect is only salient; the agent does not anticipate future group consumption.
We also assume that there are N agents, n = 1;2;:::;N such that agent i's net benet of
consuming at time t = 0 is given by:
e Vi0 = max

e V 















t(B   H)   jx   x0j; (7)
e V max









t(B   H)   jxmax   x0j; (8)




6The presence of peer inuence and thus the cost associated from the deviation from
peers' behavior, introduces a new possibility: the agent may consume the addictive quantity
directly in the rst period even if he is not physically addicted.5 This was impossible in
the previous two sections since we had B   H > Bmax   Hmax. The introduction
peers' inuence disturbs this strict inequality. In fact, the net benets from consuming the
social quantity are no longer necessarily greater than the net benets from consuming the
addictive quantity, B   H   (x    x) ? Bmax   Hmax   (xmax    x). As in the
preceding section, the extra salience parameter is always applied on present benets and
costs as time moves on, but the agent does not anticipate this change in his own preferences.
The same thing applies to the group's norm. This implies that the present value at any





maxf(1 + )B   H   jx   xtj;(1 + )Bmax   Hmax   jxmax   xtjg
+
P1
i=1 i(B   H) if not physically addicted
maxf(1 + )Bmax   Hmax   jxmax   xtj + max
 P1
i=1 i(Bmax   Hmax); 

;
 (1 + )   xtg if addicted
(9)
In this framework, consumption by one agent creates an externality through peer eects.
To simplify the strategic analysis of the model, we will, for the remainder of this section
assume that N = 2. We start by analyzing the initial decision at time t = 0.
Proposition 3 Consider two agents with identical preferences represented by e V 
i0 = b V0  
jx
i0   x0j where i = 1;2. In this context,
1. if b V0 <  x, then the dominant strategy equilibrium is necessarily such that no agent
consumes the addictive good ,
2. if b V0 > x, then the dominant strategy equilibrium is necessarily such that the two
agents consume the addictive good,
3. if  x  b V0  x, then two Nash equilibria are possible. In the rst equilibrium
both agents will consume the addictive good, in the other equilibrium, neither agent
will consume the addictive good.
5We say that an individual is physically addicted when it is impossible to stop without incurring the
cost of rehabilitation. A person may consume the addictive quantity without being addicted, in this case
the consumption is driven by the costs of deviating from peers' behavior.
7Proposition 3 implies that it may be suboptimal to consume the addictive good if V0  0.
However, if e V 
i0 > 0, the agents may still consume socially the addictive good. This has two
implications. First, the agents'consumption of the addictive good may be the outcome of
a dominant strategy equilibrium. This is the case when the magnitude of the peer eects
is insucient to reverse the agents' decision. Thus, the decision to consume the addictive
good may be economically sound or may result from procrastination. In such a context,
policy interventions similar to the ones mentioned in section 4 will be adequate. Second, the
agents' decision to consume the addictive good may result from a coordination problem.
In this case, the Nash equilibrium with no consumption will be socially superior to the
other equilibrium. Therefore, if both agents consume the addictive substance while it is
suboptimal to consume, then peers' inuence is reversing agents' decision.6 Consequently, a
policy intervention targeted towards their social network may lead to an equilibrium where
both agents do not consume.
Once the decision of consuming the addictive good has been taken, three situations may
occur: (1) both agent consume the good \socially" (xt = x), (2) both agent are addicted or
(3) one agent consume the good socially and the other one is addicted. In the rst scenario,
both agents' consumption is ex-post optimal in the sense that we know that neither of them
will ever become addicted. Therefore, in the remaining of this section, we will focus our
attention on the second and the third scenarios.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the two agents consume addictively. In this case,
1. if (1 + ) > ( + Hmax)   (1 + )Bmax, then the dominant strategy equilibrium is
necessarily such that the agents will stay addicted forever,
2. if (1+) < (+Hmax) (1+)Bmax xmax, then the dominant strategy equilibrium
is necessarily such that the agents choose rehabilitation and never consume again,
3. if (+Hmax) (1+)Bmax xmax  (1+)  (+Hmax) (1+)Bmax, then two
Nash equilibria are possible. In the rst equilibrium both agents stay addicted for one
period, in the other equilibrium, both agents choose rehabilitation for one period. As
the decisions are not time consistent, the equilibrium may switch between two periods.
6Note that in this case the inuence of peers acts as a negative externality.
8Once again, although it may be optimal to engage in rehabilitation, the agents may
choose not to rehabilitate. This has two implications. First, the agents' addictive behavior
may be the result of a dominant strategy equilibrium. As in the previous proposition this
may be economically sound or may result from procrastination. Second, the agents' decision
not to rehabilitate may be due to coordination failure. Therefore, a policy intervention that
forces the agents into rehabilitation may be optimal.7 It is important to mention that in
the multiple equilibria case, even if both agents choose to rehabilitate, there is no warranty
that they will stay clean forever.
Corollary 1 Consider the case where two addicted agents have decided to rehabilitate. In
this case,
1. if ( +Hmax) (1+)Bmax  xmax > 0, then the dominant strategy equilibrium is
necessarily such that the agents stay clean forever,
2. if ( + Hmax)   (1 + )Bmax   xmax  0, then two Nash equilibria are possible. In
the rst equilibrium both agents stay clean for one period, in the other equilibrium,
both agents choose to consume again. As the decisions are not time consistent, the
equilibria may change between two periods.
The contribution of Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 resides in the fact that it can explain
observed cyclical pattern of consumption - rehabilitation - consumption. It is clear that in
the context of this model, a policy intervention that targets the composition of the network
of friends may be desirable from a rehabilitation perspective. The decision to rehabilitate
and to stay clean forever, may be clearly inuenced by the decisions taken in the network
of friends. Thus, coordination failures may induce the agents to choose the wrong decision.
Turning our attention to the last scenario, rehabilitation may be optimal for one of the
two agents while social consumption may be optimal for the other. However, this may
not necessarily mean that such an equilibrium would materialize as such. The impact of
procrastination and social interactions may well lead to other behavioral patterns.
7This is the case even if we adopt utilitarian ethics for those two scenarios.
9Proposition 5 Consider two agents, one of them being addicted while the other is not. In
this case we have four potential Nash equilibria:
1. if (xmax   x) > (1 + )(B   Bmax)   (H   Hmax) and (1 + ) + xmax >
( + Hmax)   (1 + )Bmax then both agents consume xmax,
2. if (xmax   x)  (1 + )(B   Bmax)   (H   Hmax) and (1 + ) + x > ( +
Hmax) + (xmax   x)   (1 + )Bmax then the addicted agent consumes xmax and the
other agent consumes x,
3. if (1+)B H x > 0 and (1+)+x  (+Hmax)+(xmax x) (1+
)Bmax, then the addicted agent chooses rehabilitation and the other agent consumes
x,
4. if (1+)B H x  0 and (1+)+x  (+Hmax)+xmax (1+)Bmax
then the addicted agent chooses rehabilitation and the other agent does not consume
the addictive good.
The rst Nash equilibrium leads to an interesting situation in which a non addicted
agent consumes like an addicted agent to comply with the social norm of his group. Once
again, we have also a situation where we can switch from one equilibrium to the other.
Although movements from (1) to (2) or from (4) to (3) are not possible, it is possible to
have movements from (1) to (3) or (4) and from (4) to (1) or (2). This means then once
again, we can observe cyclical patterns of consumption-rehabilitation-consumption. In this
kind of situation, policy aiming at changing the network of friends or changing the behavior
of friends may be desirable in a rehabilitation perspective.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we highlight the role of peers in the recurrence of addictive behavior. To
do so, we use a simple \forward looking" model with procrastination and introduce peers
inuence. Results from the \forward looking" framework and the \forward looking" with
procrastination framework indicate that any policy intervention that decreases the cost of
rehabilitation or the net benet of consumption may help stoping the addictive behavior. In
this case, once the agent rehabilitates there is no recurrence. Given that recurrence is very
10frequent in addictive behaviors, we suggest a model in which this recurrence is explained by
peers inuence. The inclusion of peers inuence allows for the possibility of multiple Nash
equilibria and potential coordination failures. Our results show that while procrastination
can explain the decision to postpone rehabilitation, peer inuence is essential to explain the
cyclical patterns of addiction-rehabilitation-addiction. In such a case the desirable policy
intervention to stop the addictive behavior will be dierent. An intervention on the social
network itself may be desirable to make sure that recurrence does not occur. While there
is a growing interest in the formation of social networks and homophily (Currarini, Jackson
& Pin 2009) in this paper we assume that the network of friends is exogenous to the model.
In future work, it may be interesting to endogenize the formation of the agent's network.
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